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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 USNATO 0955

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR, PARM

SUBJ: FEB 20 NAC CONSULTATION ON EAST-WEST ISSUES AND SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

BEGIN SUMMARY: RESTRICTED NAC MEETING ON FEB 20 WAS DEVOTED TO:

-- A BRIEFING BY SIR JOHN KILLICK (U.K.) ON THE RECENT WILSON-BREZHNEV MOSCOW MEETING.

-- REPORT BY COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASSESTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN ON RECENT U.S.-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING MEETING OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AT GENEVA ON FEB 16-17.

VISCOUNT DAVIGNON (BELGIUM) AND MR. VECCHI (ITALY) WERE THE ONLY OTHER OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS PRESENT FOR THE MEETING.

FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATIONS BY THE U.S. AND U.K. REPS,
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THERE WAS EXTENSIVE QUESTIONING AND DISCUSSION BY THE COUNCIL ON GENERAL EAST-WEST ISSUES, INCLUDING THE STATE OF BREZHNEV'S

HEALTH, EAST-WEST TRADE, DETENTE, CSCE AND MBFR. END SUMMARY:

1. SYG LUNS OPENED FEB 20 COUNCIL SESSION WITH WELCOME TO SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS (WHICH INCLUDED COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASST SECRETARY HARTMAN (U.S.), SIR JOHN KILLICK (UK), VISCOUNT ETIENNE DAVIGNON (BELGIUM) AND GIORGIO VECCHI (SOVIET/EE OFFICE DIRECTOR, ITALIAN MFA).

2. LUNS NOTED THAT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS THUS MAKING PRESENT COUNCIL SESSION BOTH TIMELY AND USEFUL. HE NOTED THAT PERMREPS HAD ALREADY RECEIVED SOME DETAILS OF WILSON'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FROM BRITISH PERMREP PECK, BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO A FULLER ACCOUNT FROM SIR JOHN KILLICK WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. LUNS NOTED THAT THE UK VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS THE OCCASION OF R THE REAPPEARANCE OF BREZHNEV WHOSE HEALTH HAS PROMPTED SO MUCH SPECULATION. LUNS SAID THE COUNCIL ALSO LOOKED FORWARD TO HEARING FROM COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND

ASST SEC HARTMAN ON THE STATUS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS FOLLOWING SEC KISSINGER'S RECENT MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

3. LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL MEETING WAS TO HAVE A GENERAL REVUI OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DISCUSS SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN -- MBFR, SALT, CSCE -- SINCE SOVIET ACTIONS IN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. LUNS THEN ASKED KILLICK TO MAKE THE FIRST PRESENTATION.

4. AFTER OPENING REMARKS, KILLICK SAID HE PLANNED BOTH TO COVER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UK-USSR TALKS AND TO OFFER SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS. HE ASKED THAT ALLIED GOVTS TREAT HIS REMARKS WITH DUE DISCRETION. ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, KILLICK POINTED OUT THAT JOHN THOMPSON WOULD BE IN BRUSSELS FOR THE FEB 24 CONSULTATIONS ON SALT AND WOLD BE PLEASED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THE UK-SOVIET NPT STATEMENT.

5. KILLICK SAID THE UK SAW THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF THE WILSON VISIT
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IN THE RESOTRATION OF UK-SOVIET BILATRAL RELATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN IN A STATE OF ECLIPSE SINCE THE 1968 CZECH EVENTS AND THE UK'S EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN 1971. THE BRITISH HAD ACCORDINGLY HOPED TO GET BACK "INTO THE SAME LEAGUE" WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW, THE BRITISH HAD NO IDEA WHETHER BREZHNEV WOULD APPEAR OR NOT SINCE THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON THIS SUBJECT IN ADVANCE. THE BRITISH HAD HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT BREZHNEV WOULD MAKE AT LEAST ONE APPEARANCE, AND WERE DELIGHTED THAT HE ELECTED TO MAKE THE WILSON VISIT THE OCCASION FOR HIS "DRAMATIC" REAPPEARANCE AFTER A PERIOD OF DOUBT ABOUT HIS POLITICAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH. INDEED, WILSON HAD SPENT SOME SEVEN HOURS WITH BREZHNEV AND OTHER SOVIT LEADERS. CALLAGHAN HAD ALSO MET

SEPARATELY WITH GROMYKO.

6. THE BRITISH EXTENDED INVITATIONS TO BREZHNEV AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS TO VISIT THE UK AND GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT BREZHNEV MIGHT LIKE TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT PRIOR TO THE CPSU CONGRESS SCHEDULED FOR EARLY 1976.

7. AS FOR SOVIET OBJECTIVES, KILICK BELIEVED THAT BREZHNEV'S REAPPEARANCE WAS NOT THE SOLE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE BRITISH VISIT. MOSCOW SEEMED ALSO TO WANT TO BRING THE UK MORE INTO THE GENERAL PATTERN OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND BREZHNEV REFERRED TO THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

8. ON TRADE MATTERS, THE BRITISH HAD SOUGHT NOT ONLY AN INCREASE IN UK-SOVIET TRADE BUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE BALANCE AND STRUCTURE OF THAT TRADE.

9. ON TRADE AND OTHER ISSUES, THE BRITISH ANTICIPATED THAT THEY MIGHT BE ASKED TO PAY A PRICE FOR BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME EXPECTED "HAGGLING" OVER THE COMMUNIQUE TREATMENT OF A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, THE SOVIETS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT UK CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS. REGARDING THE UK-USSR COMMUNIQUE, KILICK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD REALIZE THAT THE UK HAD NOT DEPARTED FROM ACCEPTED FORMULAS ON KEY ISSUES.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION GENEVA

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10. AS TO HIS PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS ON BREZHNEV'S HEALTH, KILICK SAID THERE WERE NO EXTERNAL SIGNS OF PHYSICAL DETERIORATION. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND HIS SLIGHT FACIAL DEFORMITY WERE NO WORSE THAN IN THE PAST. HE DID SEEM TO BECOME EMOTIONAL ON SOME KEY SUBJECTS. HE SEEMED TO HAVE A DRY MOUTH WHEN HE SPOKE AND APPEARED TO HAVE DIFFICULTY IN SWALLOWING. BREZHNEV ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ORAL DISCOMFORT AND FREQUENTLY HELD HIS HAND TO HIS JAW. WHILE ADMITTING THAT HE WAS NO MEDICAL EXPERT, KILICK SAID THAT BREZHNEV'S ACTIONS "MADE ONE WONDER". THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT BREZHNEV WAS IN WORSE SHAPE THAN BEFORE OR THAT HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY FIT AND, KILICK ADVISED, OBSERVERS COULD ONLY LOOK FOR FURTHER SIGNS.

11. BREZHNEV'S POLITICAL HEALTH SEEMED ABSOLUTELY UNDIMINISHED AND HE WAS AS AUTOCRATIC AS HE HAD BEEN IN THE PAST. (BREZHNEV HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKED TASS CHIEF ZAMYATIN TO LEAVE THE MEETINGS TO GET TEA). AS FOR HIS PERSONAL HABITS, BREZHNEV SEEMED TO BE
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SMOKING AS MUCH AS EVER AND LOOKED AT THE SMALL CLOCK ON HIS CIGARETTE CASE ANXIOUSLY WAITING FOR HIS NEXT SMOKE. BREZHNEV ALSO DRANK AS MUCH AS EVER.

12. KILICK SAID KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO WERE AT BREZHNEV'S SIDE IN ALL OF THE MEETINGS, AND BREZHNEV TREATED GROMYKO IN THE "SUBORDINATE" WAY IN WHICH HE ALWAYS TREATS HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE HAD FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED KEY POINTS WITH KOSYGIN, BUT DID NOT SEEM DEPENDENT ON HIM ALTHOUGH HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ADVICE. AS IN THE PAST, BREZHNEV HAD TALKED WITHOUT BRIEFING PAPERS BUT HE SPOKE WITH AUTHORITY INDICATING HE WAS WELL PREPARED ON THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

13. KILICK NOTED THAT BREZHNEV SEEMED AS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO DETENTE AS EVER. AND, AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY AND AT THE KREMLIN LUNCH FOR WILSON, EVERY POLITBURO MEMBER WHO WAS IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN PRESENT INCLUDING ANDROPOV WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE UK EXPLUSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN 1971. SUSLOV WAS ABSENT, HOWEVER, AND NO REASONS WERE GIVEN. KILICK SAID THAT KOSYGIN HAD COME TO A UK-SOVIET LUNCHEON ONE HOUR LATE AND HAD REPORTED THAT HIS TARDINESS WAS CAUSED BY A MEETING WITH BREZHNEV AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS. AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING, KOSYGIN ADDED, HE COULD TELL THE BRITISH THAT THE ENTIRE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD EXPRESSED ITS PLEASURE AT THE RESULTS OF THE US-SOVIET MEETING. KILICK WONDERED IF KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT DID NOT REFLECT PREVIOUS DIS-AGREEMENT, AMONG SOVIET LEADERS ON THE VALUE OF THE UK-USSR MEETING, AND THAT PERHAPS THE MEETING TO WHICH KOSYGIN REFERRED CONSTITUTED THE ONLY OCCASION FOR THE POLITBURO TO MEET WITH BREZHNEV ON THIS ISSUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WILSON VISIT.

14. KILICK SAID THAT SOVIET DEFINITIONS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

HAD FOR A LONG TIME CREATED PROBLEMS FOR THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY AS IT HAD FOR OTHER SOCIALIST PARTIES. THE SOVIET DEFINITION, CLAIMING

THAT PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE PROVIDED FOR INTENSIFICATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE, HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS WITH THOSE WHO WANTED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WITHOUT POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DIFFERING SYSTEMS. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT AT THE KREMLIN LUNCHEON CITING THE VALUE OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT FOR VARYING SYSTEMS PROVIDED A USEFUL CODICIL TO PREVIOUS SOVIET DESCRIPTIONS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THE BRITISH THOUGHT
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IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ENSHRINE THIS LANGUAGE IN SOME OF THE BILATERAL DOCUMENTS APPROVED BY THE TWO SIDES AND IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN REFLECTED BOTH IN THE PROTOCOL ON UK-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS AND IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT. THE UK HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET ABANDONMENT OF THEIR PREVIOUS DEFINITIONS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING, HOWEVER, TO WATCH FUTURE PERFORMANCE TO SEE IF SOVIET IDEOLOGUES RETURN TO THE EARLIER MEANING OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OR ACCEPT THE NEWER FORMULATION.

15. ON MAJOR INT'L ISSUES, THE BRITISH HAD NO PARTICULAR POINT TO MAKE TO THE SOVIETS BUT MERELY WANTED A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IT WAS INTERESTING, THEREFORE, THAT IN THE FIRST BREZHNEV-WILSON MEETING ON THE FIRST EVENING OF THE VISIT, BREZHNEV ASKED FOR UK VIEWS ON WORLD DEVELOPMENTS. WILSON REPLIED THAT THE BRITISH FELT THAT SUCH ISSUES AS FEEDING THE HUNGRY, PROVIDING AID TO LDCS AND THE ENERGY CRISIS WERE AS IMPORTANT ISSUES AS WORLD PEACE. BREZHNEV REPLIED THAT, AS IMPORTANT AS THESE MATTERS WERE, PEACE AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR WERE OF GREATER IMPORTANCE. AND, SAID KILLICK, BREZHNEV HAD ADDED THAT THE "PRESERVATION OF THE WHITE RACES" WAS LAOS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ISSUES STRESSED BY THE UK.

16. BREZHNEV HAD CRITICIZED THE U.S. STATIONING OF TWO NEW COMBAT BRIGADES IN GERMANY. THE UK REPLIED THAT THE U.S. DEPLOYMENT SHOULD CAUSE NO CONCERN GIVEN THE GOWING MILITARY EFFORT OF THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS.

17. DURING HIS CONVERSATIONS, BREZHNEV SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENTS FORD AND GISCARD AND OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. HE ALSO TALKED HIGHLY OF WILLY BRANDT AND PRAISED HIM FOR BREAKING THE LOGJAM IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS.

18. AS TO ATMOSPHERICS, KILLICK SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW MUCH BREZHNEV'S POSTURE ON DETENTE WAS PLAY-ACTING, BUT HE SEEMED ENTIRELY SINCERE WHEN DISCUSSING RELATED SUBJECTS. IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON CSCE, THE BRITISH HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED A SUMMIT FINALE TO BE ALREADY ASSURED, AND THEY WERE INTERESTED NOW ONLY IN THE TIMING. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO GET THE CONFERENCE

OUT OF THE WAY BY THIS SUMMERR. GROMYKO TALKED FAVORABLY OF
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THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION BUT DISPARAGED ELEMENTS IN BASKET
III -- AT ONE POINT ASKING WHAT UTILITY ANYONE SAW IN OPENING
BARS AND CAFES IN EACH OTHERS' CAPITALS IN ITS REPLY, THE UK
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO THE FRG OF AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL
CHANGE OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE. THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE
RESPONSE BUT SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO A UK SUGGESTION THAT THIS
PRINCIPLE MIGHT BE COVERED WITHIN THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE. THE UK
HAD ALSO STRESSED THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE SEVERAL CSCE
PRINCIPLES AND HAD URGED PROGRESS ON A MANEUVERS CBM.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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LIMDIS

19. KILLICK SAID THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSION ON MBFR, AND THE
UK GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA MIGHT BE MADE
ONLY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE.

20. NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE ABOUT CYPRUS ALTHOUGH
THIS SUBJECT WAS COVERED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

21. ON UK RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, KOSYGIN WAS
INTERESTED IN HMG'S APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE AND WILSON PROVIDED
FULL DETAILS OF THE BRITISH POSITION. THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO

HAVE NO PARTICULAR PREFERENCE ON WHETHER THE UK STAYED IN THE EC OR LEFT IT. KOSYGIN HAD REPEATED HIS EARLIER INTEREST ON SOVIET-EC ECONOMIC RELATIONS BUT SEEMED TO BE AS HOSTILE AS EVER TO THE EUROPEAN UNITY CONCEPT. AS A PERSONAL INSIGHT, KILLICK SAID HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT THE UK WOULD BE MORE IMPORTANT INSIDE THE EC THAN OUTSIDE IT.

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22. ON THE STRENGTHENING OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, KILLICK SAID THAT THE UK HAD SEARCHED FOR A SUBJECT OF COMMON CONCERN ON WHICH A JOINT DOCUMENT COULD BE ISSUED. THE UK HAD ACCORDINGLY PUT FORWARD AN NPT DRAFT WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY WATERED DOWN IN DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS. WHILE USEFUL, THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT WORLD SHATTERING BUT DID NOT DAMAGE ALLIED POSITIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

23. THE SOVIETS PRESSED THE BRITISH NEITHER ON BERLIN, WHICH WAS NOT DISCUSSED, NOR ON THE INDIAN OCEAN OR DIEGO GARCIA. NEITHER DID THE SOVIETS ASK FOR AN INCREASE IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER REPRESENTATION IN THE UK.

24. IN QUESTIONS FOLLOWING KILLICK'S PRESENTATION, COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) ASKED IF THE QUESTION OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISCUSSED. KILLICK REPLIED THAT CSCE FOLLOW-ON HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED AND THE BRITISH CONSIDERED THIS SOMEWHAT REMARKABLE. THE MAJOR POINT OF INTEREST WAS THE SOVIET DESIRE TO CONCLUDE CSCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH A MINIMUM OF EASTERN CONCESSIONS. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION FROM DE STAERCKE, KILLICK SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ACTUALLY ASSERTED THAT NO PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN MBFR UNTIL CSCE WAS CONCLUDED.

HOWEVER, THE LOW IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED MBFR IN THE DISCUSSIONS REINFORCED THE IMPRESSION THAT PROGRESS IN VIENNA WOULD COME ONLY AFTER THE CSCE CONCLUDES.

25. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS BY DRAPF (FRG), KILLICK SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT SPECIFICALLY INDICATE, WITH RESPECT TO PARA 29 OF THE UK-SOVIET STATEMENT, WHAT FAVORABLE CHANGES IN THE INT'L SITUATION SHOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WANT THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN EUROPE DERIVING FROM WORLD WAR II TO BE IRREVERSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BELIEVE CURRENT LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS SHOULD NOT BE IRREVERSIBLE. KILLICK ANTICIPATED AN INCREASING SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE ARMS SPENDING IN THE WEST. ON CSCE, THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR A FORMULATION IN THE STATEMENT SAYING THAT ALL PREMISES EXIST FOR STAGE III. THE UK RESISTED AND POINTED OUT AREAS WHERE THEY BELIEVE ALL PREMISES DO NOT YET EXIST. THE SOVIETS EVENTUALLY AGREED TO A

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WEAKER FORMULATION. THE SOVIETS DID NOT INDICATE THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS TO CONCLUDE CSCE. THEY SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON BASKET III. CONCEIVABLY THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING WITH REGARD TO MILITARY MANEUVERS. THEIR GENERAL TACTIC, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE TO TRADE ON IMPATIENCE IN THE WEST OVER CSCE AND TO PRESS FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF CSCE. AS TO CYPRUS, THE SOVIETS MADE NO REFERENCE TO UK BASES BUT CERTAINLY LEFT OPEN THE OPTION OF PRESSING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UK BASES FROM CYPRUS AT SOME FUTURE TIME. KILLICK NOTED THE RUSSIAN VERSION OF PARA 34 OF THE UK-SOVIET STATEMENT REFERRED TO ONE LAWFUL GOVT "IN" CYPRUS. HOWEVER, WHEN THE BRITISH QUESTIONED THE SOVIETS ON THIS POINT, THE SOVIETS SAID THIS PHRASE HAD THE SAME MEANING AS THE ENGLISH TEXT WHICH REFERRED TO ONE LAWFUL GOVT "OF" CYPRUS.

26. DE ROSE (FRANCE) OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON THEIR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND HAD REFERRED TO A MENACE TO PRESERVATION OF THE WHITE RACE. DE ROSE WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING PREOCCUPIED SPECIFICALLY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OUTBREAK OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR CONFLICT IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT OR OF A MENACE FROM THE YELLOW RACE. DE ROSE ASKED WHETHER THE WEST LIVES IN A FOOL'S PARADISE IN NOT SEEING A MENACE THAT THE SOVIETS SEE. KILLICK NOTED THAT THERE WAS A HEAVY ELEMENT OF BREZHNEV'S EMOTIONALISM IN THE SOVIET PRESENTATION. THE SOVIET DESCRIPTION WAS NOT NECESSARILY A COOL ANALYSIS AND THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO ONE PARTICULAR MENACE. KILLICK SAID THE SOVIETS ARE SO INSISTENT ABOUT THEIR OWN DESIRE FOR PEACE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR A WESTERN STATESMAN, IN THE FACE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS SAY, TO CONVINCE HIS PARTY AND PUBLIC OF THE NEED FOR SUSTAINED MILITARY EFFORT TO MEET A SOVIET THREAT. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV SPOKE OF DEVELOPING DETENTE IN A LONG FUTURE PERSPECTIVE OF SAY 30 YEARS, BREZHNEV WILL NOT BE AROUND TO PRESIDE OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DETENTE. KILLICK SAID THE UK ACCEPTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT AT PRESENT AGGRESSIVE IN A MILITARY SENSE. BUT THE UK IS CONCERNED WITH A POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS ATTEMPTING TO USE MILITARY SUPERIORITY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

27 SVART (DENMARK) AGREED THAT THE BASIC THREAT OF SOVIET POLICY WAS POLITICAL AND NOT MILITARY. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SECRET

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INTERESTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WEST BUT RATHER IN EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST. KILLICK COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CAREFUL TO SAY NOTHING WHICH COULD DEROGATE FROM THE IMPRESSION THEY DO NOT DESIRE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WEST. HE ADDED THAT THE UK LEFT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN NO DOUBT THAT THE UK ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY IN PORTUGAL.

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28. MENZIES (CANADA) ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH HAD GAINED ANY INSIGHTS INTO THE OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET POLICY AFTER CSCE. DO THE SOVIETS EXPECT TO PURSUE DETENTE PRIMARILY THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THEIR MAJOR PARTNERS IN THE WEST? OR DO THE SOVIETS HAVE MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES IN MIND?. MENZIES ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFERENCE IN PARA 2 OF THE UK-SOVIET PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS TO COOPERATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. KILLICK SAID WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THE SOVIETS HAVE A DETAILED PLAN ON HOW TO FOLLOW UP ANYTHING. HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS REGARD CSCE AS THE END OF A CHAPTER MARKING THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET POWER OVER EASTERN EUROPE. AS TO FOLLOW-UP, SOVIET INTENTIONS MAY BE PRIMARILY NEGATIVE IN THAT THE SOVIETS WULD TRY TO AVOID FOLLOWING UP SOME ASPECTS OF ACKET III. THE SOVIETS ARE OPPORTUNISTS AND WILL PROBABLY SEE ADVANTAGE IN DEALING WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS.THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO BASKET III WHERE THE SOVIETS WILL WISH TO AVOID GIVING THE WEST AN OPPOR-
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TUNITY TO GANG UP ON THE SOVIETS REGARDING BASKET III FOLLOW-UP. KILLICK NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS RETAIN A LATENT INTEREST IN EXTENDING THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION TO ASIA.THE SOVIETS MAY RENEW THEIR PROPOSALS ON ASIAN SECURITY AFTER CSCE IS CONCLUDED.

HOWEVER, ASIAN SECURITY WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH THE BRITISH IN MOSCOW. KILLICK ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO WANT TO TREAT THE UK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AS A EUROPEAN COUNTRY. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT READ MUCH INTO THE REFERENCE TO COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IN THE UK-SOVIET STATEMENT. THIS COULD REFER TO COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, BUT THERE WAS NO SOVIET EFFORT IN MOSCOW TO PROMOTE A FORMULATION WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE THE U.S. AND CANADA.

29. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE UK AGREEMENT TO EXTEND A LARGE CREDIT TO THE SOVIETS. KILLICK REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT A GOVT-TO-GOVT CREDIT. IT WAS RATHER A TARGET OR CEILING WITHIN WHICH CONTRACTS COULD BE MADE. HE SAID THE CREDIT PROVIDED A USEFUL HEDLINE FOR THE BRITISH, BUT HE DOUBTED THE TARGET LEVEL WOULD BE ACHIEVED. KILLICK SAID NATO DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS COULD HELP AVOID A SITUATION WHERE THE SOVIETS COULD EXPLOIT WESTERN COMPETITION FOR SOVIET TRADE. KILLICK THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION OF SOVIET CREDIT WORTHINESS.

30. COMMENTING ON KILLICK'S REFERENCE TO CYPRUS, ERALP (TURKEY) SAID FOR THE RECORD THAT TURKEY BELIEVES THERE IS AT PRESENT NO LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CYPRUS. THERE ARE RATHER TWO COMMUNITIES WHICH ARE TO FORM A FEDERATED GOVT. KILLICK SAID THE BRITISH MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THE UK DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF CYPRUS, IF NECESSARY THROUGH A FEDERAL GOVT.

31. IN TURNING TO SONNENFELDT AND HARTMENT, LUNS SAID THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE PUSHING WITH SOME SUCCESS IN BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH WESTERN LEADERS FOR AN EARLY CSCE SUMMIT. SONNENFELDT SAID THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA DEALT AT LENGTH WITH MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET CONCERN HAD TO DO WITH RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS. WHILE IT WAS DIFFICULT TO REACH A HARD CONCLUSION ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, IT WAS SONNENFELDT'S IMPRESSION THAT THE
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SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANTLY PREPARED TO LET THIS PROCESS GO FORWARD. THERE WOULD BE NO GENEVA CONFERENCE UNTIL THE PARTIES WERE READY TO ATTEND. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO ALLOWING THE CURRENT PROCESS TO CONTINUE UNTIL THE PARTIES WERE READY TO GO TO GENEVA.

32. ON CSCE, SONNENFELDT SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIAN ARE ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE CONFERENCE SOON WITH A CONCLUSION AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. IT IS CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEIR EARLIER IDEAS ABOUT DATES ARE UNREALISTIC, THAT NOT EVEN PHASE II WILL BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II. HE SAID THE U.S. FOUND THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE WAS LARGELY SIMILAR TO WHAT KILLICK HAD

REPORTED. THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEANS SAY THEY WILL ACCEPT NO REFERENCE TO PEACEFUL CHANGE IN CONNECTION WITH INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. HE SAID THERE WAS POSSIBLY SOME MOVEMENT ON THE FOMOUS WORD "ONLY", BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHAT FLEXIBILITY THERE IS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS POINT. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE MUST BE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS ON CSCE. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT WANT THIS TO BE THE LAST ISSUE IN CSCE. ON CMBS, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION. HE NOTED THAT THE RECENT SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT ON MANEUVERS APPEARS TO CONCERN MANEUVERS MORE THAN 100 KM. BACK FROM THE FRONTIER. ON BASKET III, THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR DISCUSSION EXCEPT THAT THE U.S. LEFT THE SOVIET SIDE IN NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS OF INTEREST TO US, AND THAT AGREEMENT IS NEEDED.

33. SONNESNFELDT SAID THERE WAS NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF MBFR. HE SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO SEEK FURTHER PROGRESS IN CSCE BEFORE THEY CONSIDER FRESH MOVES IN MBFR. HE SAID HE ALSO FELT THAT WITH SALT NOW IN AN ACTIVE PHASE, THE SOVIETS MAY NOT INCLINED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL DECISIONS IN THE MILITARY AREA, SO MBFR MIGHT ALSO BE HELD BACK UNTIL THERE IS FURTHR PROGRESS IN SALT. HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW SOVIET MOVEMENT REGARDING THEIR OWN POSITION.

34. SONNENEFLDT SAID THAT DESPITE THE CLEAR DIFFERENCES ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOVIET FIRMNESS ON THE TRADE LEGISLATION FRONT,

THE MEETINGS IN GENEVA WERE FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE, WITH A
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POSITIVE TONE. GROMYKO SEEMED MORE RELAXED AND AT EASE THAN IN SOME TIME.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5047

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION GENEVA

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LIMDIS

35. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT IS IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM OF THE TRADE LEGISLATION PROBLEM WHICH DISTRUBS THE SOVIETS. IT IS THE U.S. IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN CONTAINING THE EFFECTS OF THAT SPISODE. THE U.S. HAS DETECTED NO MARKED SOVIET RETROGRESSION FROM PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON OTHER SUBJECTS. HE THOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO WORK AROUND THE HANDICAP OF LACK OF MFN AND CREDITS, AND HE NOTED THE ONGOING COMMERCIAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR. HE THOUGH IT OF INTEREST THAT BREZHNEV CHOSE THE VISIT OF A WESTERN LEADER TO RE-EMERGE AND RE-IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH THE EXISTING SOVIET APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE SAW THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE GENERAL POLITICAL LINE REMAINED INTACT. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD NO ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS ON BREZHNEV'S HEALTH. BUT WE WOULD SPECULATE, IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENT HEALTH PROBLEM, THAT THERE WAS SOME THOUGHT IN MOSCOW REGARDING THE SUCCESSION. HOWEVER THE U.S. HAS NO EVIDENCE. WE ASSUME THAT BREZHNEV WANTS AN ORDERLY SUCCESSION.

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36. KILLICK SAID THAT THE UK HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TRADE LEGISLATION ISSUE HAD A DEEP PSYCHOLICAL IMPACT ON THE SOVIETS, BUT THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE U.S-SOVIET RELATIONS AS BEFORE. HE NOTED THAT BREZHNEV, IN DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR PEACE AND FOR AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR, SAID THAT "IT IS ONLY ME TALKING" AND TOMORROW THERE MIGHT BE SOMEONE ELSE IN HIS PLACE.

37. DESTAERCKE SAID THERE NOW SEEMED TO BE A CERTAIN CAUTION ON THE SOVIET SIDE ABOUT DETENTE, AS COMPARED WITH THE CERTAINTY THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY EVINCED. HE THOUGH THE WEST SHOULD BE SIMILARLY CAUTIOUS. HE ALSO ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD CRITICIZED THE STEP-BY-STEP POLICY IN MOSCOW.

38. KILLICK, IN REPOSE TO DE STAERCKE'S QUESTION, SAID THE SOVIETS HAD STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE STEP-BY-STEP POLICY, AND CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, BUT NOT IN A VEHEMENT OR HIGHLY EMOTIONAL WAY. HE THOUGH THERE WAS A CERTAIN REALISM IN THE SOVIET POSITION, THAT THEY DON'T SEE MUCH IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS.

39. DE ROSE ASKED KILLICK OF BREZHNEV'S REMARK THAT TOMORROW THERE MIGHT BE SOMEONE IN HIS PLACE MEANT THAT THERE

COULD REALLY BE A REPLACEMENT SOON, OR WHETHER BREZHNEV WAS SIMPLY INDICATING MORTALITY. KILICK SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO DRAW TO MANY CONCLUSIONS FROM ONE PASSING REMARK. ONE COULD DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT BREZHNEV WAS SIMPLY SAYING "LETS YOU AND I AGREE NOW."

40. MENZIES ASKED IF KILICK COULD COMMENT ON THE DISCUSSION OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SITUATIONS ARISING WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER PEACE. WERE THE RUSSIANS REFLECTING PHRASES IN THE AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OF LAST JUNE? KILICK REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND THE KIND OF LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

41. KRAPF NOTED SONNEFELDT'S REMARKS THAT THE SOVIETS WANT PROGRESS IN CSCE AND SALT BEFORE THERE IS PROGRESS ON MBFR. HE ASKED IF SONNEFELDT THOUGHT THE SOVIET INTEREST IN MBFR WAS DEEPLY ROOTED OR WHETHER HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT LOSE INTEREST
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IN MBFR ONCE CSCE AND SALT WERE CONCLUDED. SONNEFELDT REPLIED THAT THIS HAS TO BE SPECULATIVE. ONE CAN NOTE THE RIGIDITY OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON MBFR. THE LINK WITH CSCE AND SALT IS SPECULATIVE, ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV HAD SAID TO US THAT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CSCE WOULD PROVIDE NEW IMPETUS IN MBFR. THERE IS A GENERAL SOVIET INTEREST IN WHAT THEY CALL MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS ARE AWARE OF WESTERN DOMESTIC PRESSURES REGARDING DEFENSE BUDGETS, BUT THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS THAT RAPID FLUCTATIONS CAN OCCUR, ESPECIALLY IN THE U.S, SO THEY WOULD PREFER REDUCTIONS BY AGREEMENT RATHER THAN BY UNILATERAL ACTION. THE POSSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ACTION IS NOT A REASON FOR THEM TO WANT TO REDUCE BY AN AGREEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INCLINED TO MAINTAIN SUBSTANTIAL FORCES ON THEIR WESTERN FRONT. THIS IS A STRONG SYMBOL OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO DEEP EXCESSIVE WESTERN INFLUENCE AT ARMS LENGTH IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN DETERRED FROM LARGE, RAPID REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THERE IS ALSO THE OFFENSIVE POINT OF MAINTAINING A LARGE BRIDGEHEAD IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE SOME INCENTIVES IN MBFR. SONNEFELDT SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW, WHEN CSCE IS COMPLETED, AND THERE IS FURTHER PROGRESS IN SALT, THERE WILL BE A SOMEWHAT HEIGHTENED SOVIET INTEREST IN MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE, AND THE SOVIET DECISION MAKING PROCESS CAN FOCUS MORE ON MBR. HE SAID IT WAS NOT EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO FOCUS SIMULTANEOUSLY ON STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, AND IT WAS EASIER FOR THEM TO APPROACH THE TWO IN SEQUENTIAL FASHION.

42. DE ROSE HAD A QUESTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST BUT FIRST WISHED TO SAY HE WAS INTRIGUED WITH THE ANSWER SONNEFELDT JUST GAVE ON MBFR. DE ROSE SAID THE STANDARD ALLIED HYPOTHESIS WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROCRASTINATE IN MBFR WITH THE HOPE THAT TIME WOULD LEAD TO UNILATERAL U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS--FOR WHICH THE SOVIETS NEED GIVE NOTHING IN EXCHANGE. HE PROMISED TO GIVE

CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO SONNEFELDT'S POINT OF VIEW. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FRENCH PERMREP ASKED WHETHER IN TALKING TO GROMYKO ON GENEVA THE U.S. GOT THE IMPRESSION THE SOVIETS INTEND TO COME UP WITH SOME ENCOURAGEMENT--SOMETHING POSITIVE--PERHAPS A NEW ATTITUDE THEY MIGHT TAKE IF THE TALKS ARE RETURNED TO BENEVA.

43. SONNEFELDT RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS BASIC POSITION REGARDING
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THE NATURE OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT REMAINS UNCHANGED, I.E. IT CONTINUES TO BE A MAXIMAL AND ALL-ENCOMPASSING APPROACH TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THUS, HE COULD NOT SAY THAT THE U.S. HAD ANY SPECIFIC ADVANCE ENCOURAGEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO IN GENEVA REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

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USDEL SALT TOW GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION GENEVA 2284

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LIMDIS

44. LUNS INTERVENED TO CLARIFY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS' MBFR INCENTIVES AS SONNEFELDT HAD OUTLINED THEM AND THE CUSTOMARY ALLIANCE WIDOM TO WHICH DE ROSE HAD REFERRED.

45. SONNENFELDT SAID HE WAS ONLY TRYING TO SHARE WITH THE COUNCIL SOME SPECULATION AS TO WHAT SOVIET INCENTIVES MIGHT BE. HOWEVER, IN HIS VIEW IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIES REPRESENTED AT THE COUNCIL TABLE MAKE VERY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT PROGRESS

IN DETENTE CANNOT PROCEED IF THE SOVIETS INSIST UPON A LARGE DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SONNENFELDT SAID HE SOMETIMES THOUGH THE ALLIES' WORST ENEMY IS THE WORD "DETENTE" WHICH SEEMS TO OBSCURE AND OVER-SIMPLIFY THE ISSUES WE FACE. IN THE LONG RUN, A POLITICAL BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE MUST BE PREDICTED UPON A SUBSTANTIAL BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. "LET US NOT TALK OURSELVES INTO A FRAME OF MIND THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE", HE SAID.

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46. SVART REMARKED THAT MANY ALLIES BELIEVED ANOTHER REASON WHY THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT FAVOR A SUDDEN SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL U.S. TROOP REDUCTION WAS THAT THIS MIGHT GIVE A "SHOCK IMPETUS" TO WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

47. KILLICK AGREED WITH SVART BUT SAID HE THOUGHT SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TAKING A GREAT LEAP FORWARD HAS UNDOUBTEDLY LESSENED. KILLICK SAID HE ALSO AGREED WITH SONNEFELDT'S POINT THAT MILITARY DETENTE AND POLITICAL DETENTE COMPLEMENTED EACH OTHER. HE THOUGHT BREZHNEV'S PROBLEM WAS THAT UNTIL HE HAS A CSCE CONCLUSION WHICH IN EFFECT OFFICIALLY CONCLUDES WORLD WAR II, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONVINCE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS THAT MOVEMENT IS REQUIRED IN MBFR.

48. ITALIAN CHARGE SPINELLI QUESTIONED THE KISSINGER-GROMYKO COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON CSCE--SPECIFICALLY THE WORKS"...THEY ASSUME THAT THE RESULTS ACHIEVED PERMIT ITS CONCLUSION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL".

49. SONNEFELDT REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIAL DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF THE LEVEL AT WHICH CSCE WOULD BE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THERE NOW SEEMED TO BE A GENERAL ASSUMPTION THAT IF THE CONFERENCE IS GOOD ENOUGH TO BE COMPLETED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL, IT IS GOOD ENOUGH TO BE COMPLETED AT THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL. FURTHERMORE, IT SEEMS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT IF PHASE II IS COMPLETED THE PARTIES WILL GO TO PHASE III. SONNEFELDT CONTINUED SAYING THE PHRASE QUOTED ABOVE DOES REFER TO THE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT THE END OF PHASE II RATHER THAN RESULTS ACHIEVED TO DATE. HE HOPED THIS WOULD HELP EXPLAIN THE STRANGE SNYNTAX THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED UPON.

50 BELGIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR DAVIGNON COMMENTED ON WHAT HE TERMED AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY WHICH EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADERS MUST COPE WITH WHEN THE CSCE IS CONCLUDED, ESPECIALLY IF IT IS CONCLUDED AT HIGH LEVEL. HE SAID POLITICALLY THE SITUATION VISA-A-VIS PUBLIC OPINION WILL CHANGE IN THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS NO LONGER WILL ENJOY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE OF THE ONGOING CSCE CONFERENCE WHICH TENDS TO RETAIN IN THE PUBLIC MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING THE DE FACTO SITUATION IN EUROPE. THE ONLY

EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS REMAINING WILL INVOLVE THE MILITARY
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CONFRONTATION. DAVIGNON THEN REFERRED TO RUMORS THAT IN THE WINDUP
OF CSCE PHASE II IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REACH SOME REMAINING
COMPROMISES AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL RATHER THAN AT THE DELEGATION
LEVEL AT GENEVA.

51. SONNEFELDT REPLIED THAT WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING MORE, SINCE
ABOUT A YEAR AGO, ABOUT THE NOTION OF INVOLVING FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE PHASE II. HE SAID THE U.S.
FOREIGN MINISTER DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE ANY SUCH PARTICIPATION.

52. LUNS COMMENTED ON DAVIGNON'S OBSERVATION ABOUT PUBLIC
OPINION AND SAID THAT IF DAVIGNON WAS RIGHT, IT WOULD APPEAR
THAT THE FRENCH WERE CORRECT ALL ALONG IN STAYING OUT OF MBFR.

53. KILLICK INTERVENED TO SAY THAT IT IS SIMPLY TOO DIFFICULT
TO ARGUE WITH SUCH A "WORST CASE" ANALYSIS. RETURNING TO
EARLIER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT GROMYKO'S PERSONALITY, HE SAID THAT
MR. GROMYKO'S "BLOODY MINDEDNESS" THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIQUE
DRAFTING SESSION IN MOSCOW WAS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE
RUSSIAN SINCE IT SUCCEEDED ONLY IN MAKING MR. CALLAGHAN
"CROSS" AND LESS YIELDING.

54. LUNS SAID ONE POINT WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE EMERGED FROM
THE MORNING'S DISCUSSION WAS AN INTENSE SOVIET INTEREST IN AN
EARLY CSCE SUMMIT. HE THOUGHT THE LESSON FOR THE ALLIES WAS
THAT OUR CSCE POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED, AND THEREFORE WE
SHOULD BE FIRM BECAUSE WE HAVE SOMETHING TO OFFER. SECONDLY,
HE NOTED THAT CHINA WAS NOT MENTIONED AT ALL, EITHER IN MOSCOW
OR IN GENEVA. LUNS THEN ASKED WHETHER SONNEFELDT DETECTED
ANY LATENT LINK BETWEEN CSCE AND SALT.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5049
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION GENEVA

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LIMDIS

55. SONNEFELDT SAID HE SAW NONE OTHER THAN THAT THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS HAD THINGS IN COMMON IN TERMS OF THEIR BOTH BEING CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HOWEVER, SONNEFELDT SAID HE WAS DISTURBED BY WHAT SEEMED TO HIM TO BE THE "HELPLESS BYSTANDER" POINT OF VIEW WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED THIS MORNING AROUND THE TABLE. SOME FORESAW ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WATCHING HELPLESSLY AS A SUCCESSFUL CSCE CAUSE A WAVE OF EUPHORIA TO OVERWHELM OUR PEOPLE. THE WHOLE PANOPLY OF DETENTE MAKES SENSE, NOT AS A POLICY DESIGNED TO CHANGE SOVIET INTENTIONS OR TO MODIFY THEIR POWER, BUT RATHER AS A POLICY WHICH ALL OF US ARE PURSUING TO PROVIDE OURSELVES WITH A MEANS TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THAT IS, WE CAN INFLUENCE THE WAY THE SOVIETS CONSTRUE THEIR OWN INTERESTS BY A MIXTURE OF INCENTIVES AND BENEFITS PLUS PENALTIES. THUS, BY OPENING UP AVENUES OF CONTACT WITH THEM, WE DO NOT REGARD OURSELVES AS FEEDING A FORACIOUS SOVIET MONSTER, BUT RATHER AS GIVING THE SOVIET UNION INCENTIVES FOR RESTRAINING BEHAVIOR AND PROVIDING OURSELVES WITH THE MEANS TO INFLUENCE THEIR BEHAVIOUR, IN THAT WE HAVE THINGS

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THAT WE CAN WITHDRAW. THIS, COUNSELOR SONNEFELDT SAID, IS WHAT UPSET THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE TRADE LEGISLATION. WE SEE OURSELVES AS HAVING BEEN DEPRIVED OF AN INSTRUCMENALITY OF THIS SORT. SO THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER ONE BELIEVES OR DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "DETENTE" BUT RATHER HOW DO WE USE THE STRUCTURE WHICH HAS EMERGED IN A WAY TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOUR. THUS WE WON'T TELL OUR PEOPLE THAT AFTER CSCE WE ARE AT THE END OF AN ERA, BUT RATHER THAT WE NEED EVERY INSTRUMENT WE CAN GET TO INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOUR, AND THE STRUCURE OVER THE YEARS TO COME.

56.

56. DAVIGNON SAID THAT HIS CONCEPT OF DETENTE IN THE ABSTRACT WAS NO DIFFERENT. HOWEVER, IN THE PRACTICAL PLANE PEOPLE DON'T REACT THAT WAY. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE THAT CERTAIN OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE ENGAGED IN A DECISION WHETHER TO BUY ONE MILITARY AIRCRAFT OR ANOTHER. ORIGINALLY IT WAS A QUESTION WHETHER TO BUY AIRPLANE "X" OR AIRPLANE "Y. RECENTLY, THE QUESTION HAS BECOME WHETHER TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY. AND WHETHER IF WE BUY SHOULD THE AIRCRAFT HAVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OR NOT. HE SAID THIS IS THE TYPE OF PUBLIC THINKING WHICH HE SEES EMERGING AND IT IS

NOT A QUESTION OF ANY ALLY'S INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND OR LACK OF INTENTION TO DO THOSE THINGS WHICH HAVE TO BE DONE. IT IS SIMPLY HIS PREMONITION THAT WHEN HEADS OF STATE AT HELSINKI ALL STAND UP AND PROCLAIM THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENT AND HIGH SIGNIFICANCE OF CSCE RESULTS, THE ALLIES WILL THEN HAVE TO DO A LOT TO RECOVER LOST GROUND.

57. LUNS CONCLUDED SUGGESTING THE NATO PRESS SPOKESMAN MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TODAY HELD A CONSULTATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TOOK STOCK OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS; THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY SIR JOHN KILLICK OF THE UNITED KINGDOM; COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN OF THE UNITED STATES; VISCOUNT ETIENNE DAVIGNON, POLITICAL DIRECTOR OF BELGIAN MFA, AND GIORGIO VECCHI OF ITALY. BRUCE

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